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 … E non sapeva più 
vivere 
nella tenda dei suoi 
dove si ascolta la cantilena 
del Corano 
gustando un caffè 
 
E non sapeva 
sciogliere 
il canto 
del suo abbandono 
      G. Ungaretti, In memoria 
 
[… And he had forgotten how/ to live/ 
in his people’s tent/ where one listens 
to the chant/ of the Koran/ sipping a 
coffee// And he had forgotten/ how to 




What we are experiencing today in different ways on social, national 
and international levels because of the flow of migrants and the 
populistic backlash is not separated from the sense and the task of 
our personal existence, from the way we can and must realise 
ourselves. Following Paul Ricoeur’s three different discursive axes 
within which the dialectic tensional intersection of crisis and conflict 
reach a significant speculative level, a careful analysis deepens the 
intertwining of historical, cultural and anthropological factors, 
demonstrating that those who disregard foreigners despise 
themselves. 
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1. Introduction 
With the Arab Spring, the generalised destabilisation in the Middle 
East and the devastating war in Syria, the flow of migrants has 
assumed colossal dimensions, transforming the blue Mediterranean 
Sea into a place of biblical, extreme and devastating facts, of 
miraculous and cursed events. Philosophical reflective and critical 
reasoning does not have speculative discourse as its sole territorium, 
above all when it intends to claim and cultivate sensitivity and values 
that are declared humanistic with regard to dramatic issues such as 
the issue of migrants and refugees. No humanistic bulwark is built up 
with words alone, especially if we are dealing with the question as 
middle-class Europeans who tend more and more to stay indifferent 
to the numerous defensive manifestations of an increasingly populist 
and xenophobic Europe1. The fact is not new; European history has 
been a history of darkness and division since ancient times, and 
extremism is always ready to rise again everywhere, even beyond 
the specific discourse concerning Europe. In this, the action of evil 
seems increasingly more acute and industrious compared with the 
good, which tends to doze off and not notice things until it ‘has the 
blade pointed in his throat’, so to speak. 
However, numerous positive resources exist and more 
constructive forces can be brought into the field than negative and 
destructive ones. What we are experiencing today in different ways 
on a social, national and international levels is not separated from 
the sense and the task of our personal existence, from the way we 
                                                 
1 On the theme of migrants, one of the most dramatic memories of my youth goes 
back to 27 March 1997. That day, referring to the Albanese migrants coming in Ita-
ly, Irene Pivetti at that time member of the Lega Nord, parliamentarian of the Re-
public and former President of the Chamber of Deputies (from 1994 to 1996) de-
clared in a scandalous public communication: ‘Rebut them at sea!’. The following 
day (what an obscure coincidence of words and facts!), the military ship Sibilla 
rammed in the Adriatic Sea the Albanian ship Kater I Rades causing the death of 
108 migrants. 
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can realise ourselves. The determination and willingness to face 
challenges and progress generates much more vitality and creativity. 
In this, I embrace a fairly Hegelian conception of human 
emancipation, that is, a conception of emancipation closely linked to 
the struggle for freedom and justice.  
In this paper, I will try to show how anthropological 
philosophical models, such as that of contemporary French 
philosopher Paul Ricoeur, point out how one’s challenge towards 
oneself is the first and most important field of emancipation. The 
struggle against the numerous forms of ‘tyranny’, servitude, 
negative power and destructiveness has a close connection with this 
personal inner-self challenge.  
Democracy can be tyrannical and crushing. Democracy goes into 
crisis when it stops progressing, when it lacks control and corrective 
tension. This point has been significantly underlined by Jürgen 
Habermas. In a 2008 editorial (published in Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung) he compares the potential and perhaps actual decline of 
capitalist democracies and markets to the decline and collapse of 
tyrannies and totalitarianism2. 
 
2. Around Crises and Conflicts 
The matrix of the possible degeneration and collapse of democracy 
has been identified since the time of Plato. Plato describes with 
precision the structural mechanisms of the decay of democracy and 
of its sliding into anarchy. This degradation directly affects the 
decline of social customs and moral life. For Ricoeur, democracy is 
an ideal in the making. More than reality there is a social and moral 
                                                 
2 Closing an introductory presentation at the conference with the (former) minister 
of foreign affairs Frank-Walter Steinmeier (Berlin, 23 November 2007), he explains 
that democracy and the market economy are not immune to self-destruction 
exactly as totalitarian systems. And if on the one side it is true that, unlike these, 
they have built-in brakes, then on the other side, the brakes also require 
continuous overhaul and maintenance (see Habermas, 2009). 
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condition requiring a perpetual battle that those who are living at the 
present time have the task of carrying on. When a crisis appears in 
democracy, it means that something is interfering or even stopping 
this search for perpetual progress. In fact, democracy is an idea in 
the making and in combat, and the crisis is a moment in history 
whose momentum must be regained (Ricoeur, 1947: 300). 
Democracy is not an ideology, first and foremost it is ‘une pratique, 
c’est-à-dire une action, un combat, un ‘drame’ au sens propre du 
mot’ (302). Individualistic, totalitarian, anarchic or reactionist crisis 
determines the destruction of the responsible and active citizen who 
is the foundation of democracy. 
Today, individualism constitutes the predominant mentality; it is 
an individualism that can generate ruthless and inhuman 
indifference. Following the French philosopher, I say that the current 
decay of democracy which parallels the spread of populism, 
antiestablishmentarianism, xenophobia and the like is directly 
connected to a distorted dialectic conflict/crisis within oneself toward 
oneself, as well as between individuals and the social world. Ricoeur 
identifies three different discursive axes within which the dialectic 
tensional intersection of crisis and conflict reaches a significant 
speculative level. They are overlapping and intertwined axes, which 
are useful to reconsider in a re-actualising perspective.  
Somehow, we are already pursuing the first axis, as it is placed 
between critical conscience, the ‘logic’ of civic conduct and the life of 
public institutions. The second axis is thematically placed between 
philosophy of history and critique of modernity, and it is essentially 
deepened by Ricoeur from the philosophical moral perspective, as 
revealed in the 1988 paper ‘La crise: un phénomène spécifiquement 
moderne?’. In this work, a generalised use of the notion of crisis 
emerges. Ricoeur uses it to make reference to Marcel Mauss, which 
provides him with a way to recognise within the phenomenon of the 
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crisis the configuration of ideas and values through which a society 
understands itself (see Id., 1988: 10). However, every ‘regional’ use 
has, to a certain extent, generalisable aspects (which can be 
coordinated within the framework of the ‘total social fact’ [Mauss]). 
(1) The notion of crisis as a medical determination can be applied in 
a generalising manner to social reality, interpreting it as a kind of 
‘body’ (social body). (2) The pedagogical sense of crisis has shown 
itself to be fertile in generalisation already through the example of 
Kant’s criticism. (3) The political sense(s) of crisis connects on the 
one hand the crisis of the question of legitimisation, i.e. crisis of 
legitimacy, and on the other hand crosses the problematic of ethical 
nature (‘insofar as the legitimisation of power refers to the 
axiological configuration by which society defines itself’ [11; trans. 
V.B.]). Such a critical and practical register of discourse seems to me 
not only to characterise this analysis of the historical social decline 
into crisis and conflict but to offer a comprehensive view for 
developing useful consequences reflecting around our current times. 
A third axis is disposed between the pole of an anthropological 
philosophical research concerning human identity and the way in 
which we develop personal identity and the pole of a theory of 
(human, social and political) recognition. No civic conduct or 
institutions exist that are not linked to the emancipation of 
individuals and peoples, and without emancipation of individuals and 
peoples there cannot be civic and institutional progress.  
Let us follow the question of democracy (first axis) for a further 
step. The crisis is part of the contemporary history of democracy as 
such, because democracy is a living historical fact and an idea in 
perpetual action and movement. This formula combines two different 
understandings of the notion of crisis and democracy: in fact, if on 
the one side it is by embracing the perspective of historical 
knowledge and political science that we may make a clear reference 
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to democracy as something of historical and living in progress, on 
the other side it is by embracing a specific practical philosophical 
perspective that we may say that it has to do with something in 
perpetual, civic and moral action. This point of view parallels 
Ricoeur’s view that goes even beyond claiming for ‘religious’ 
explanations. The 1972 paper ‘Le conflit: signe de contradiction ou 
d’unité?’ problematises the reflective and experiential aporia of 
putting together the interpretation of conflict as a pivotal element of 
historical progress and the practical religious prescription of ‘love 
each other’. Ricoeur develops two interesting criticisms around this 
question. The first attacks the illusory idea that conflict will be 
diminished by the extension of the prescience; quite the opposite, in 
fact, it is destined to increase as the consequence of the exercise of 
control and other ‘staffs’, such as planning and rationalisation, that 
are connected to the ideology of prescience. In addition, the nature 
of political decision in itself is to be a non-reducible source of 
conflict. In fact, ‘the character of decision, which is attached to the 
political as such, with its procession of constraint, force and violence, 
seems (…) an unsurpassable trait of political action as such’ (Id., 
1972: 191; trans. V.B.). Hence, the inevitability of conflict and its 
fertility emerge as structural consequences together with their 
counterpart (which follows an identical ‘logic’) that is the reactionary 
effect, which proposes a pacified and freed new government for the 
people via (again) conflict (that is, via an anti-establishment 
populistic approach, for example by mobilisation of resentment). 
‘Hegel had already meditated on this abrupt reversal of the 
theoretical negation of the conflict to the destructive fury of the 
Terror’ (Ib.); and similar consequences emerge analysing the Marxist 
theme of the class struggle. At the end, ‘there is an irreducibility of 
the socio-political conflict to the situation of dialogue borrowed from 
our interpersonal experience’ (192). 
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Reflecting around the theology of love, Ricoeur underlines how 
no room exists for ideological use of it in politics. In fact, it must be 
relocated within the original context of a global theological preaching 
from which it draws a variation more in the sense of the justice of 
living than of the politics of living, and with which it reveals its 
nature as a specific conflict generator. Obviously, the theology of 
love participates in social and political dialectics, but it must be 
rediscovered and replaced in a wider and more comprehensive 
manner together with the communitarian and cosmic dimension of 
living. Conversely, a common ideological translation of the theology 
of love is given in its unilateral reduction to a singular model, that of 
dialogue, behind which the attitude and strategy of the camouflage is 
often at work. If this first criticism attacks the ideology of (false) 
dialogue (that is dialogue without effective dialectics, but is formal 
and superficial, as it is still widespread today), then the second 
criticism aims to unmask the widespread of an ideological approach 
to conflict determined by a ‘diffuse Hegelianisation of all our 
thoughts and all our behaviours’ (193), that parallels the elevation of 
all conflicts to a cultural phenomenon. At the end, ‘son souci 
lancinant est de vouloir le conflit pour le conflit, afin de provoquer 
par la polarisation une sorte de catharsis sociale’ (Ib.). As the 
political discourse, public communication aims to investigate the 
logic of events from this perspective. It is a simplified way that 
mirrors a generalised limit in terms of understanding and 
emancipation. And because of that, the migrant becomes a priori a 
source of difficulty, an inevitably negative and problematic 
counterpart. The foreigner ‘opposes us’, he/she is ‘against our order’, 
‘our culture’ and ‘our values’ etc. Why does a limitation exist in 
terms of personal and social emancipation behind similar 
statements? Because, as our discourse becomes more and more 
enlightening, the horizontal, interrelational plane of personal or 
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social relation with the foreigner(s) perpetually crosses the vertical 
plane of oneself with himself/herself, that is of oneself with the one’s 
inner foreigner, with the alterity within us (hic sunt leones). The 
phenomenon of challenges, conflicts and changes touches the knot of 
individual responsibility, according to an idea of progress or 
emancipation, which somehow pushes back to Hegel. At the end, 
‘only the one who keeps in the deepest part of his conviction the 
demand for a synthesis of freedom and meaning, of arbitrariness and 
of institution can live sensibly the central conflict of modern society’ 
(201). 
On the one side, we have the fact of a perpetual sequence of 
conflict and crisis that parallels the many challenges of lives at a 
personal and social level and that has potential for progress and 
emancipation. On the other side, an improper, ideologised 
understanding exists of this dialectic between conflict and crisis that 
must be thematised and recognised. In some ways, it has even more 
distorting effects in Europe, because movements, encounters and 
clashes of peoples across its lands have been a European 
phenomenon since the beginning of its history. Actually, it is Europe’s 
ethos (see Id., 1992). Somehow, crisis is always potentially a 
‘carrier’ of something positive and productive, and not necessarily via 
violent conflicts and rivers of blood. Europe is a land of disastrous 
things, as well as a land of invention, beauties and values. It is a 
generous land, even, with about 40 million foreigners who are 
residents.  
Following Ricoeur’s line of reasoning as developed in the papers 
we are referring to, I underline how crisis is modernity itself.  
Philosophical analysis is helping us to understand that to say 
‘crisis’ is not the same as saying ‘ruin’ or ‘destruction’. It is not the 
catastrophe and it is not the end, exactly as a crisis of migration 
does not constitute a problem or something negative a priori. History 
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clearly shows that the European ethos has been characterised since 
its rise for the movement of peoples through its lands3. Thus, in 
Europe (or elsewhere), there are neither pure races, nor pure ethnic 
groups, nor pure nationalities, if by ‘pure’ we mean something ‘not 
contaminated’ by the foreign presence, by the passage of the 
foreigner. Each one of us has foreign ancestors in his/her lineage and 
(then), historically genealogically speaking, is a foreigner in his/her 
proper homeland. The essence of Europe is not just cultural 
arrogance and colonialism. Europe is also flowering with new 
knowledge, new possibilities and new hopes. Today, Europe has the 
double face of Janus: on the one side, it has the look of wisdom, and 
on the other side, it has the look of deconstruction. 
Europe is a cultural paradise populated by devils, festive lambs 
and silent, well-mannered persons. And a new unstoppable stream of 
migrants is entering it to shake things up.      
 
3. The Crisis is the Possibility  
As mentioned, Ricoeur identifies different uses of the notion of crisis. 
Among these, the gives us medical clinical use, in which ‘crisis’ 
                                                 
3 This is a universal and international fact, beyond the specific case of Europe. In 
2015, the broadcast datum for international migrants was up from 247 million of 
people, with 65.3 million forced migrants. As the International Migration Report 
2017 writes, ‘The number of international migrants worldwide has continued to 
grow rapidly in recent years, reaching 258 million in 2017, up from 220 million in 
2010 and 173 million in 2000’ (International Migration Report, 2017: 5). In 
addition, it underlines the following: ‘The global level of forced displacement across 
international borders continues to rise. By the end of 2016, the total number of 
refugees and asylum seekers in the world was estimated at 25.9 million, 
representing 10.1 percent of all international migrants. The developing regions 
hosted 82.5 percent of the world’s refugees and asylum seekers. In 2016, Turkey 
recorded the largest refugee population, hosting some approximately 3.1 million 
refugees and asylum seekers. The country experienced the most significant 
increase in the refugee population since 2000 when it hosted just over 3,000 
refugees. In 2016, the second largest country of asylum was Jordan, hosting 
around 2.9 million refugees, followed by the State of Palestine (2.2 million), 
Lebanon (1.6 million) and Pakistan (1.4 million). Germany (1.3 million) and Uganda 
(1.2 million) also hosted more than one million refugees and asylum seekers in 
2016’ (7–8). 
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indicates a critical moment in the course of a certain disease, and 
the psycho-physiological and pedagogical use related to the 
evolutionary age, where the crisis is the growth that marks the 
transition from one age of life to another, emerging as particularly 
significant and fertile. By following the meaning mirrored through the 
second use, we may say in general that to live a moment of crisis is 
to leave a moment of change, and the acceptance of such a 
challenge is not accepting the crisis as such or suffering from it. 
Accepting the challenge of the crisis means, in fact, to live the 
change that creates a way of challenging the possibilities of change 
and contributing to its realisation. Thus, under this perspective, 
‘challenging the possibilities’ becomes per se to change. ‘To change’ 
is ‘to live’. In fact, the struggle against the present resistances, the 
commitment to overcome the limits of present circumstances and 
the effects of past actions give no other possibility than the opening 
of the doors of the future. Challenging moments of crisis generate 
and regenerate new strength and hope. As a Europeanist in a similar 
mould to Habermas, Ricoeur is aware of the many difficulties that 
Europe faces because of its strong nationalistic identities and 
specificities nourishing hope for the Europe of tomorrow. Habermas 
is a rationalist thinker and a philosopher of communication and 
institutions. I take the liberty of expressing my opinion by arguing 
that although I understand his conception and embrace a large 
number of his considerations and proposals, I do not share his basic 
approach, which seems to me to be both positively pragmatic and 
excessively formalising. The challenges of today and tomorrow’s 
Europe are not only challenges for rationality. They would not be 
won by the rationalised order of bureaucratic systems nor via the 
rationalisation of the relationships. 
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4. Communicative Distortions About Migrants: A Factual 
Survey Around the Italian Case 
Today, pessimism seems to be hailed as expressive of a ‘more 
realistic’ attitude compared with optimism. The disenchanted 
pessimist seems more realistic, where looking for the positive seems 
to be of no use. The negative act attracts and substantiates more 
breaking news. Even the media operate systematically in accordance 
with these sorts of criteria of obscure emotionality.  
I do agree with what Habermas underlines in this regard, 
starting from the consideration of the role of the great media in the 
formation of public opinion and democratic will. An effective and 
professional public communication deploys an essential force of 
stimulus and orientation for the formation of public opinion and the 
will of the citizens, which at the same time forces the political system 
to transparency and correct alignment. Without the impulses of a 
press capable of making an opinion and providing reliable 
information and accurate analyses, the public sphere can no longer 
produce these energies (see Habermas, 2008). 
Today, the issue of migrants is an emblematic case in this 
regard. On the one side, we have been listening for years to many 
authentic news items reporting on true cases of suffering and 
desperation, of tragedies, from Lampedusa and the like. On the 
other side, such news also features torrents of rhetoric filled with 
populism. 
The Italian case is emblematic in many ways because of the 
populistic momentum we are living now, because the different 
sensitivity people experience is within the public debate at a general 
communicative level (new media included) as well as political and 
politico-religious levels. However, the Vatican and the many different 
humanitarian and social organisations directly or indirectly related to 
the Catholic Church played and are still playing a positive role.     
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National research by the Faculty of Communication Science, 
University of Rome ‘La Sapienza’ (2009) concerns immigration, 
refugees and the Italian media (Ricerca nazionale su immigrazione e 
asilo nei media italiani). Among other things, we learn that 
‘foreigners appear more frequently than Italians when they are 
responsible for, or victims of brutal events such as sexual violence 
(more than triple: 24.1% against 7.2%), personal injuries (more 
than double: 24.1% against 10.9%), assault (17.0% vs. 4.4%) or 
finally theft (11.3% vs. 8.7%)’. The portrait of foreigners 
immortalised by the media can then be subsumed as follows: It is 
often of a criminal, it is of a male (nearly 80%) and his personality is 
covered from the detail of his nationality or ethnic origin (which is 
often present in the titles of the news)’ (Morcellini, 2009: 2–3; trans. 
V.B.). Out of a sample of 5,684 news reports examined during the 
survey, only 26 spoke of immigration without linking it to security 
(see Id.: 3). Former UNHCR regional representative for Southern 
Europe (1998-2012) and former president of the Chamber of 
Deputies (2013-2018) Laura Boldrini underlined that ‘the study 
shows, in a scientific way, how Italian medias have been 
reproducing, for years, the same stereotype on immigration, without 
reflecting that it is a phenomenon in constant and rapid evolution. 
Italian medias have not updated their way of talking about it, neither 
the terms of language, which is poor, reductive and diminishing, 
least of all in the contents. One speaks of immigration almost always 
in relation to the facts of crime, judicial facts and landings’ (quoted 
in Sciortino, 2011: 21; trans. V.B.). This research was undertaken 
about ten years ago, but I suspect that things are worsening. This 
rejection of foreigners must be a visceral response of the Italians, 
amplified by the media, because it is impossible to imagine that 
Italians have forgotten that just few decades ago they were a people 
of migrants (across the United States of America, Belgium, Germany, 
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Argentina and other countries). The waves of migration have always 
aroused fears and overreactive behaviours. All countries tend to 
‘defend’ their lands and close the gates. However, experience shows 
that, if well managed, the arrival of migrants is not a danger. On the 
contrary, it enriches social, economic and cultural exchanges (see 
Id.: 15–16). Together with its ‘security package’ (Law 94 of 15 July 
2009), Italy has a strong need of an ‘integration package’, which 
should come first (see Id.: 25). Behind this reasoning are multiple 
arguments of historical, cultural, humanistic and civic order. In 
addition, we may consider even pragmatic aspects, as the 
Fondazione Leone Moressa’s annual reports concerning the economy 
of immigration. The reports show highly significant data. In the 2014 
report, we read, for example, that ‘despite the [2008’s] economic 
crisis, foreigners continue to be an important component of our 
economic system. (...) During the five-year period 2008 2012, the 
importance of foreign presence increased both among workers and 
taxpayers. In 2008, foreigners made up the 7.5% of the total 
number of employed persons, while those born abroad represented 
7.8 % of the total number of registrants. In 2012, the incidence of 
the immigrant presence rose to 10.2% among workers and to 8.5% 
among taxpayers’ (Fondazione Leone Moressa, 2014: 74; trans. 
V.B.). In addition, ‘Overall, the revenue from taxpayers born abroad 
is € 6.74 billion, that is 4.4% of the total revenue, a value higher 
than that recorded in 2011 (€ 6.56 billion)’. In the 2017 report, the 
Fondazione indicates that in 2015, the revenue is € 11.5 billion or 
5,2% of the total revenue (see Id., 2017: 6). ‘Despite the 2008 
crisis, between 2009 and 2012 the percentage of immigrants on the 
total taxpayers who pay a positive net tax has grown steadily, albeit 
slowly, from 6.8% in 2009 to 7.2% in 2012’ (Id., 2014: 86). Finally, 
‘In Italy, the 497,000 companies led by foreigners contribute, with 
85 billion euros, to the creation of 6,1% of the national added value’ 
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(141). The 2017 report shows that the national gross added value 
increased up to 8.9%, recording that in 2016, more than 571,000 
companies were led by foreigners (with 94.2% of exclusive foreigner 
conduction) (see Id., 2017: 7).    
I rehearse here some data on economic income so that the most 
markedly pragmatic minds can start pondering. The counter-
argument that foreigners can earn and contribute because they ‘steal 
work’ from the Italians is an unfounded argument. A 2008 Banca 
d’Italia (Italy’s Central Bank) report highlights that a considerable 
part of the work done by foreigners is not work that many would like 
to do at equal wages and environmental conditions. In addition, the 
work of many foreigners allows many Italians, especially women, to 
work outside their home (see Sciortino, 2011: 25–26). In addition, 
as Italians, we have become less flexible in relation to issues such as 
working hours, mobility and displacement.  
I believe that the real knot of the current challenge ‘launched’ 
by the migratory movement is a challenge both to our democracy 
and to our civic, moral and personal emancipation. We have the right 
to correct and complete information, as much as we have the duty to 
conduct prompt action and an open, argumentative communication. 
It is not fair that through an ideologised concept of ‘freedom of 
speech’, we can make legitimate and acceptable any communicative 
distortion. Everyone has personal challenges to carry forward of 
him/her toward himself/herself, first, because everyone has the 
‘foreigner’, the alterity inside. 
 
5. The Foreigner inside  
It is time to come back to the discursive axes of intertwining of crisis 
and conflict through which Ricoeur identifies a significant series of 
speculative aspects that we are applying to the current phenomenon 
of migration and the acceptance/refusal of foreigners across Europe. 
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Together with the previously considered historical and cultural 
arguments, we must move now towards the main discourse, which is 
placed between theory of recognition and anthropological philosophy. 
As a restarting point, we may consider Ricoeur’s 1998 paper ‘La crise 
de la conscience historique et l’Europe’, which focuses on the theme 
of human consciousness, starting from a perspective that directly 
connects it between historical knowledge and future, and between 
experience and project. Ricoeur uses Koselleck’s two poles of ‘space 
of experience’ and ‘horizon of expectation’ as the elements of a 
perpetual dialectics that determines historical consciousness. This is 
human consciousness, something connected to the historical 
dimension of the human being and to its creative openness towards 
the new. The specific characterisation of the European historical 
consciousness can emerge from the typical way in which Europeans 
experience their present and live their horizon of expectation. As 
Ricoeur explicitly asserts in this paper, ‘The crisis is not a contingent 
accident, much less a modern disease. It is constitutive of the 
European consciousness’ (Ricoeur, 1998: 30; trans. V.B.). This is 
determined from the significant and strong fragility generated by its 
jagged cultural and identitarian composition which makes up this 
consciousness, and fragility and pathology share a certain degree of 
proximity and interconnection. The crisis of the European 
consciousness is shown to be pathological in two aspects at least, 
according to Ricoeur: first from the aspect of memory, for the 
paradox of the abuses of memory and forgetting (see also Id., 2004: 
443ff) and second from the aspect of the future or horizon of 
expectation, for the fact that Europe is experimenting with a poverty 
of substance. Such a double pathology is not without impact and 
consequences on our present time, because the present is the place 
of dynamic and dialectic conjugation between the space of 
experience and the horizon of action, i.e. between reflection and 
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creation. There is empty initiative when future perspective has no 
substance, and no fertile ideas are present if consciousness is lacking 
in historical sensitiveness, knowledge and awareness. ‘This is the 
reason why we see here and there a privatisation of desires and 
projects, a cult of short-sighted consumerism. At the origin of this 
movement of retreat one discerns without difficulty a disengagement 
with respect to any civic responsibility. (...) Individualism, which is 
often regretted without analysing it, is probably only the effect of the 
withdrawal movement out of wanting to live together and out of the 
civic contract that ratifies the latter. Here again, the pathology of the 
social bond only makes visible the extreme fragility of such a bond’ 
(Id., 1998: 31). 
Somehow, Ricoeur’s solution comes from the same pathological 
factors or aspects. First, the fragility of cultural variations and 
fragmentations suggests a productive reference to migration as a 
reunifying and creative movement of people across lands. Secondly, 
the present effect of rampant individualism suggests renewing the 
reference to communities of life (just making the effort to 
reexperience something similar to). And thirdly, the emptiness in 
projects and perspectives invites a deep critical reflection around the 
human condition and its meaning, overcoming the pathologies of 
memory via a collective narration and the exchange of testimonies. 
The solution of historical narration among migrants in the European 
space collects these elements in a first productive and significant 
solution.  
Ricoeur also indicates a practical cure more specifically aimed at 
the sense of the future, which is the cure of innovation via renewing 
the dialectic of innovation and tradition, that is, to ‘release the 
broken promises of the past’ (34). This cure must go in parallel with 
the ‘integration into the same horizon of waiting of heterogeneous 
modalities of anticipation’ (Ib.), which means to accept and 
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recognise the other, the foreigner and the bearer of alternative 
values or vision and the foreigner. This is the most difficult 
challenge. It is not an impossible task, but a utopia at least. 
However,  
 
‘l’important est que nos utopies soient des utopies 
responsables, qui tiennent compte du faisable autant que du 
souhaitable, qui composent non seulement avec les 
résistances regrettables du réel, mais avec les voies 
praticables tenues ouvertes par l'expérience historique’ 
(35).  
 
As Weber explains, the morality of conviction must go hand in hand 
with the morality of responsibility. I stress the validity of this point of 
view by following a line of speculative reasoning and construction 
that puts in constrictive connection the question of migrants and 
foreigners with the process of personal emancipation. This discursive 
line finds corroboration in Ricoeur’s anthropological philosophy as 
developed in his book Oneself as Another (1990) via a hermeneutical 
phenomenology of the self through which he not only incorporates 
his previous research on the unconscious and Cogito’s internal 
alterities but also profiles imputability as one of the constitutive 
components of the capable human being. This represents a clear 
reference to the social sphere and a clear recognition of how the 
social and moral dimensions are within inner human life.   
Multicultural humanism must nurture the life of our diversified 
communities, especially as the presence of foreigners tends to 
nourish the curiosity and beauty of the encounter, experience and 
exchange. Why? Because the struggle for personal emancipation is 
one with the struggle for the emancipation of public communication, 
community life, democracy and society. To overcome prejudice 
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against foreigners is to overcome prejudice against one’s ‘inner 
stranger’, the ‘extraneousness to oneself’. To consider a foreigner a 
‘stranger’ with the same mixed sense of interrogation and rejection 
that predominantly parallels almost all uses of the word ‘stranger’, 
mirrors a generalised and short-sighted refusal to embrace 
strangeness, difference and alternativeness, to recognise its value, 
reality and dignity. Ricoeur grasps this point magnificently in his 
2004 book, The Course of Recognition: ‘We do not mistake ourselves 
without also being mistaken about others and our relations with 
them’ (Id., 2005: 257). He is able to grasp and project this concept 
in a profound way thanks to a psychoanalytic lesson, which he 
studied and mediated extensively. The conquest and recognition of 
the inner human alterity is the first step in personal emancipation. 
This otherness is the regressive, instinctual or repressed alterity. The 
otherness is what we really are. The otherness is our uniqueness. To 
a certain extent, the search for personal (identity) emancipation is 
the search for the expression of our otherness uniqueness, and blind 
adherence to a due social form, to a due role, to a due national 
identity, to a due ‘normality’ (i.e. to follow the norm) and is exactly 
what denies the expression of our otherness and uniqueness. Those 
who do not wish to meet and welcome the stranger or foreigner do 
not wish to meet and welcome themselves. The thematic passage for 
mutual recognition is not the passage of secondary relevance, but 
rather is strictly linked, first, to the philosophy of the capable human 
being, secondly, to the idea of the dialectic of recognition as an 
emancipatory process and, thirdly, to emancipation as a process of 
recognition. It is thanks to The Course of Recognition that the 
dialectics between power and capacity, which constitutes the core of 
Ricoeur’s philosophy of the capable human being, is connected with 
the emancipatory dialectics of recognition: that is, personal identity 
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comes from and depends on a process of emancipation through the 
dialectics of recognition. 
The theme of recognition enters Ricoeur’s philosophical 
discourse with the discovery of the ‘conflict of interpretations’ (in the 
1960s). It emerges through the philosophical dialectics of 
Hegelianism and Freudianism as discussed in Freud and Philosophy: 
An Essay on Interpretation (1965). From the comparison between 
Hegel’s phenomenology and Freud’s psychoanalysis, Ricoeur derives 
the idea of subjectivity as a dialectical hermeneutic process that is 
continually stretched between the opposites of archê and telos, of 
the unconscious and the spirit, of necessity and freedom, and of 
destiny and history (Id., 1970: 459; see Busacchi, 2011 and 2015). 
In some way he tries to make a synthesis between Hegelianism and 
Freudianism, and this is how, for Ricoeur, the relationship between 
the Id and the ego becomes a sort of dialectic between domination 
and servitude. And it is precisely in it that the theme of recognition 
finds a way of speculative access, as revealed in book III, chapter III 
as well as in The Conflict of Interpretations (around the question of 
the subject). The grafting of the theme of recognition is favoured by 
the lesson of Alexander Kojève, with his interpretation of Hegel’s 
struggle for recognition as expressed in his master-slave dialectical 
relationship, where Kojève focused on the element of desire. This is 
the essential field in which we find those theoretical and speculative 
elements that become central in Ricoeur’s philosophy of the capable 
human being, that is, the relationship of oneself with his/her own 
otherness, the relationship of oneself with the other(s), the 
development of the self and the interpretation of personal identity as 
a dialectical process of recognition.  
 
Conflict and crisis must be faced and challenged, in whatever 
form and whenever they arise. They are to be understood as 
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characteristic and progressive inevitable phenomena of both the 
human condition and the real world. Winning the challenge of conflict 
and crisis is the path of human emancipation in all senses: personal, 
cultural, civic, moral and social.  
It is true that sometimes, this challenge has to do with a 
concrete menace of disharmony, evil and destruction which may 
come from the internal and the external life. But the logic of our 
discourse does not change. What changes is the sense that we are 
considering and experiencing each specific case, the object of fact 
that requires our emancipatory response and the emancipatory 
response of a society of principles, institutions and laws. Under a 
certain perspective even evil and violence are in part progressive 
forces in themselves. As Ricoeur underlines in his short essay on 
Evil, a challenge to Philosophy and Theology (1986), the problem of 
evil is not just a speculative problem; it demands convergence 
between thought, action (in a moral and political sense) and a 
spiritual transformation of feelings. On the level of thought, the 
problem of evil deserves to be defined as a challenge, and a 
challenge is always a check for always premature syntheses, and a 
provocation to think more and differently. Evil is first of all what 
should not be, but it must be fought and it is an integral part of each 
of us: if we reject evil as unrelated to our human condition, we reject 
an integral part of ourselves. By emphasising the practical and active 
struggle against evil, we are not losing the fact of suffering. In 
reverse, not only is every evil committed by someone badly suffered 
by another, but actively accepting all challenges connected to evil, as 
well as to conflict and crisis, means to suffer. Suffering is a 
quintessential part of the human condition4.  
                                                 
4 As Ricoeur writes: ‘The road to recognition is long, for the “acting and suffering” 
human being, that leads to the recognition that he or she is in truth a person 
“capable” of different accomplishments. What is more, this self-recognition 
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As a result of this combined reasoning, we can say that every 
personal or collective action which decreases the amount of conflict 
and violence exercised by persons against each other decreases the 
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